Basketball diaries: Switching without a point
Luka Doncic and the Mavericks are revealing the Clippers' potentially fatal flaw.
Whenever I break down game film, my first instinct is to illuminate greatness before scolding mistakes. That was the subtext of my most recent Damian Lillard piece, in case that wasn’t obvious.
But after closely watching Game 4 of the Mavericks-Clippers first-round series, I found myself going against that usual heuristic. Take nothing away from Luka Doncic, who put together a performance for the ages while hopping around on a bum ankle. Yet I also understand why Clippers fans are launching metaphorical grenades at their own team instead of shrugging at Luka’s magic. This was not a great player overcoming the opponent’s best effort. LA’s defensive mistakes, both schematic and execution-wise, were unforced errors that made Luka’s life a lot easier.
The goal of this game diary is to convey that point without taking away from Doncic’s performance. Luka was great, but the Clippers also screwed up in ways that had less to do with the pressure Doncic put on them and more to do with their baffling propensity to make their defense more complicated than necessary.
Enough rambling, Mike! Let’s get to it.
FIRST QUARTER
Gonna try to keep this brief since we have a ways to go.
11:31 — The Clippers’ first defensive possession foreshadowed all the awful communication to come. The Mavericks run Trey Burke from one corner to the opposite wing, a maneuver known as an Iverson cut because the former 76ers great often used it. Burke catches the ball, turns away from a Maxi Kleber ball screen, and glides to the basket using the red carpet the Clippers graciously laid out.
How did two of the game’s elite in Paul George and Kawhi Leonard screw this coverage up so badly? George thinks the plan is to force Burke down to the baseline, a more traditional pick-and-roll strategy. He’s nudging Burke that way and ushering him into Leonard’s waiting arms.
Leonard, on the other hand, plays this as if he and George are interchangeable parts of the same operation. He’s taking a step out to the top of the key, either to trap Burke or (more likely in my opinion) switch onto him and have George go to Kleber.
So they miscommunicated. Bizarre for the very first play of the game, but it happens.
The far more worrying thing for Clippers fans is how both stars reacted to the miscommunication. Here’s the point where someone has to pick up Burke instead of nobody, scheme be damned.
This sequence reminds me of Doris Burke’s commentary during the 76ers’ game-sealing loss to Boston a few hours prior.
Here’s what Doris said:
So I think you have to have a level of desperation if you’re the Philadelphia 76ers, and it starts with the best player on the floor, and that’s Joel Embiid. Philosophically, are you in drop coverage? At the point of the screen in Game 3, Embiid was a little bit more up. Shake [Milton] failed to push him left. But Embiid’s pointing. Like, alright, Shake failed. He didn’t push him to the left hand side. But your best player has to be better."
Now let’s change a few words around.
So I think you have to have a level of desperation if you’re the Los Angeles Clippers, and it starts with the best player on the floor, and that’s Kawhi Leonard. Philosophically, are you in ICE coverage? At the point of the screen in Game 3, Leonard was a little bit more aggressive. Paul [George] failed to push him right. But Leonard’s pointing. Like, alright, Paul failed. He didn’t push him to the right hand side. But your best player has to be better."
Sounds about right, doesn’t it?
9:55 — Can’t blame Leonard for this one.
I do think Kristaps Porzingis’ absence contributed to the Clippers’ confusion. Their key Game 3 adjustment was to put Leonard on Porzingis and slide Ivica Zubac to Dorian Finney-Smith. The goal was to switch most Porzingis screens, which neutered his impact as a floor spacer and got Leonard more actively involved in the most dangerous Mavericks action without making him guard Doncic for 48 minutes.
With Porzingis a late scratch, Rick Carlisle inserted small guard Trey Burke into the starting lineup, giving the Mavericks had a second initiator to attack on-ball switches instead of a pick-and-pop machine. The Clippers had to juggle their matchups again on the fly and couldn’t use the same overall strategy anymore. I’m not sure they ever adjusted.
6:21 – This play shows how George’s offensive struggles go beyond poor shooting. Ivica Zubac comes to set a screen to spring George to the left, but he hesitates for a second, perhaps because Leonard hasn’t cleared out. That split second is enough time for Tim Hardaway Jr. to jump onto George’s left shoulder and force him back to Kleber’s waiting arms.
The best version of George either surges into Zubac’s screen or gives a hard fake that way to force Kleber out of position on the backside.
SECOND QUARTER
10:09 and 9:41 — Lou Williams spends the early part of the second quarter making a mockery of Dallas’ pick-and-roll defense. He already generated seven easy points on the Clippers’ first three possessions. Now, he kicks his game into overdrive.
First, he bounces off an excellent Zubac screen, slows down to pin Seth Curry on his back, and surges to the hoop for an easy finish. The slowdown gives Zubac time to roll and occupy Kleber’s attention without allowing Curry to veer back into the play.
Carlisle takes Curry out and puts Hardaway back in, but it doesn’t end up mattering. Lou responds by letting Hardaway get over Zubac’s pick, lulling him and Kleber into a false sense of security before surging back to the right.
Zubac also deserves credit for setting two excellent screens. He usually doesn’t play with the reserves, but switching him to this lineup sprung Williams free and powered the Clippers’ 21-point lead.
6:02 — The flip side of using Zubac with the second unit is that Montrezl Harrell is now with the starters. Doncic has been reluctant to attack the hoop with Zubac in throughout the series, but has no such fear with Harrell.
George should know that and pinch in to show Doncic a wall and protect his big man. Instead, he does this.
3:47 — In addition to his offensive exploits, Doncic played a great defensive game. This closeout on George is why I’d like to see “great chest” added to the basketball lexicon. Doncic’s foot speed to cut off George is useless if he can’t also absorb body contact without using his hands.
But this play also underscored the Clippers stars’ frustrating lack of chemistry. I don’t understand why George rolled to the basket instead of popping to either wing. Harrell is already in the dunker spot on the opposite baseline, so rolling just allows Boban Marjanovic to play both Clippers at once.
2:41 — Let’s not mince words: there’s no reason for Kawhi to switch off Doncic this easily. I don’t care what the scheme calls for him to do. You cannot be your team’s best defender and also pass the buck to your weakest in Jackson.
I don’t know the reason why the Clippers switched that action. Maybe Leonard was following Rivers’ orders. All I know is that Leonard has confused his teammates with late switches a lot more than in years past.
THIRD QUARTER
This is when all hell broke loose for the Clippers. I’ve never seen an elite team do this much finger-pointing in transition.
11:09 - Pardon my French, but what the fuck is happening here?
The normal matchups are as follows:
Shamet on Hardaway
George on Burke
Morris on Doncic
Leonard on Kleber
Zubac on Finney-Smith
The Clippers should have little trouble adhering to those assignments from this position. Shamet is running to Hardaway after falling down on a drive to the basket. George has located Burke with little trouble. Leonard has time to play free safety as Shamet gets back before picking up Kleber.
Instead, we get three Clippers performing a live version of the Spiderman meme.
Leonard appears to be asking George to guard Kleber so he can pick up Burke. Shamet acts as if Leonard is instructing him to go to Burke so Leonard can stay with Hardaway. George is wondering why his teammates are making this more complicated than necessary. I’m with him on that point.
But instead of rolling with the punches, George does this.
ENHANCE.
Instead of accepting the switch, George demands that Leonard go back to the original matchups. He moves away from Kleber, Leonard predictably doesn’t react quickly enough, and Kleber gets a layup.
It’s one thing to communicate poorly. It’s another to dwell on that miscommunication and compound the error. The Clippers somehow did both.
10:10 — And then they did the exact same thing a minute later! I’m gonna let the GIF do the talking.
I don’t know who’s most at fault for these breakdowns. It is noteworthy that Leonard is the first pointer in both sequences.
There’s more Clippers miscommunication in this quarter, but you get the point. Let’s talk about Luka.
4:31 and 3:46 — These two assists show the power of Doncic’s “last step,” a phrase I tried to sneak into the basketball lexicon two years ago. (There’s still time!). The length and strength of Doncic’s last step allows him to keep Leonard on his back and create the angle for this drop-off to Marjanovic.
Lou Williams deserves blame for not pulling in to at least bother Marjanovic’s roll. But one reason he doesn’t is that it briefly looks like Leonard can get back in front of Doncic — or at least force him further to the right and make that pass more difficult. Doncic’s second-to-last step does take him further right in an attempt to keep Leonard on his hip.
But Doncic wins the battle because he possesses the flexibility to push back to the left with that last step. That slight movement keeps Leonard out of the play, engages Harrell, and creates a crease to pass to Boban.
It’s so hard to leap this far with one foot and stay on balance while your body weight pushes you the other way. It’s … dare I say, athletic.
That’s the first example of Doncic’s last step. Friend of the program Kevin O’Connor identified the other.
1:59 — Speaking of last steps, Doncic’s balance on this one is remarkable. The much-maligned baseline camera actually helps us appreciate it more.
Two other things to note before we skip ahead:
The Clippers began the possession in a zone before switching to man-to-man just when they needed to shrink the floor most. The whole point of going zone is to not defend a pick-and-roll two on two like this. What happened?
Doncic again does not hesitate when he sees Harrell playing drop coverage. And that explains why the Clippers …
FOURTH QUARTER
5:40 to 1:02 — … take out both bigs and play Morris at center alongside Leonard, George, Williams, and eventually Jackson (instead of Shamet). They were tired of Doncic getting downhill in pick-and-roll and destroying their bigs in the paint. Doncic would have to do his thing another way.
It also turned the game into a two-way hunt for the mice in the houses. LA put the ball in Leonard’s hands and had their small guards screen to bring Burke and/or Curry directly into the play. At the same time, their personnel encouraged Dallas to use Doncic to target their small guards in Williams or Jackson. The Clippers figured their star was better equipped for that kind of game than Dallas’.
That was a smart bet given the combination of Leonard’s experience and Dallas’ well-documented crunch-time offensive issues. Doncic and the Mavericks won some battles, including this vicious stepback over Jackson that foreshadowed the game’s final play.
But the Clippers won the war. Outside of a couple stepbacks, Doncic struggled to turn the corner and force mismatches for himself. LA’s weak defensive guards did a decent job showing high enough to divert Doncic’s path and allow his primary defender to recover.
That set up the possession that completed LA’s comeback. The play ends with Luka trying and failing badly to go at Leonard, but George is the unsung hero. As Doncic and Finney-Smith try to target Williams, George roams off his man to muck up the middle, giving Williams time to retreat to Finney-Smith and Leonard a chance to get back to Doncic.
38.1 — The Mavericks respond with a beautiful set play that uses Doncic and Finney-Smith as decoys on one side while sneaking Hardaway off a Kleber flare screen on the other. This should’ve resulted in a wiiiiiide-open shot for Hardaway.
Just one problem: Hardaway forgot the play was for him.
The play breaks down and the Mavericks commit a shot-clock violation. I don’t have much to say about the shot Leonard missed at the buzzer. Let’s go to overtime
OVERTIME
We’re skipping ahead to the end, but let’s at least acknowledge that Burke and Finney-Smith saved the Mavericks with several crucial hustle plays.
1:04 — This was clever by the Clippers. They go back to a more traditional two-man alignment with Leonard screening for Williams. Burke leans to Williams’ left because he believes this is just another tactic to force him to switch onto Leonard.
But the Clippers know that Burke is expecting the same old thing and use that against him. Williams hits Burke with a vicious crossover away from the screen and surges down the open lane for a three-point play.
Jeff Van Gundy is not happy with Hardaway. “You’re guarding Reggie Jackson in the corner. You’ve got to give help!” he bellows. “Lou Williams is not missing an uncontested layup!” JVG’s not wrong, but the play wasn’t supposed to go that way in the first place. Hardaway’s mistake was due to the Clippers’ play design, not an unforced error like some of LA’s botched coverages.
50.0 — BEHOLD YOUR LAST STEP KING.
That final leap must’ve covered 10 feet and given Doncic enough balance to contort his body to face the basket. “Not athletic” lol.
19.0 — As we’ll explain shortly, I think Kawhi Leonard may be receiving too much blame for allowing a switch on Doncic’s last-second shot. But this? This is bad.
Jackson overplays Doncic’s right hand when jumping out, suggesting to me that he was showing hard while expecting Leonard to recover. There’s 12 seconds on the shot clock, so this isn’t a switch-everything situation. Despite all that, Leonard … allows himself to be screened by Tim Hardaway? On the most important possession of the game? This isn’t exactly a hard screen by an elite-level screener.
Perhaps Leonard was fearful of Doncic’s passing and wants to avoid a 3 on 2 situation on the opposite side. But those three Mavericks still need to spread out further, which should give Jackson enough time to get back to Hardaway. Besides, how is that more dangerous threat than Doncic against a small defender with all that space to drive.
Instead, Leonard slinks to the opposite side and watches Jackson predictably bite too hard on Doncic’s lefty dribble and open up the easy spin back to the right.
9.0 — At least Leonard atoned for his mistake.
This is a a vicious hesitation move to open Michael Kidd-Gilchrist’s stance.
And this is a legitimate and necessary no-look pass to set up Morris in the corner.
Kleber deserves some blame for overhelping, but it’s tough to ask a big man to stay at home when Kawhi Leonard is driving to the basket with 10 seconds left in a one-point playoff game.
0.0 — OK. Let’s talk about the last play. There’s a lot going on here.
First, the shot. This is a thing of beauty.
The last step to shake Reggie is filthy.
Of course, this is not the first right-to-left stepback 3 Doncic has taken in his career. Isn’t Doncic magical moment the Clippers’ fault to some degree? I objected to this line of thinking with Damian Lillard’s 35-foot bomb in Game 1 against the Lakers, but I can’t here. The Clippers absolutely deserve blame for allowing an overmatched Reggie Jackson to defend Luka with that much space and the game on the line.
Jackson certainly deserves some, less for the decision to switch and more for failing to deny Doncic the ball. The whole point of switching every off-ball screen is to disrupt the play’s timing. This is not disrupting Doncic’s timing.
Does that mean Leonard was wrong to not waive off the gameplan, fight through Kleber’s screen, and *Mark Jackson voice* take the challenge to get the job done? I think that’s a bit harsh in this specific instance. Interestingly, there was one Clipper who didn’t switch his screen.
Had George followed the switch-everything plan, he would have been in position to jump out on Doncic instead of Jackson. That might’ve made a difference!
So that brings us back to Rivers. I don’t have an issue with the edict to switch every screen. I was the guy defending Frank Vogel for taking Roy Hibbert out before LeBron James’ buzzer-beating layup in the 2013 Eastern Conference Finals.
But I do have an issue with leaving a defensive sieve like Jackson in the game to execute that strategy. Yes, Patrick Beverley was in street clothes. Yes, going back to Zubac would’ve been impossible given his lack of foot speed. But Harrell and JaMychal Green were both better options than Jackson, especially after Carlisle showed his hand by leaving Kleber in instead of Burke. Asking why Jackson failed to deny Doncic the ball is like wondering why a toddler is throwing a temper tantrum.
Yes, the last several paragraphs are irrelevant if Doncic misses. Perspective, Mike. Perspective.
But don’t be surprised if these communication issues come back to haunt the Clippers down the road — assuming they even beat Doncic and the Mavericks.